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This paper presents research findings on regional human rights tribunals and forced 
displacement. It assesses the response of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) system to Ǯ sǯ  Ǯ ǯ  
lodged against Turkey and originating from the conflict between State security 
forces and the PKK (Partiya KarkaQ? ȌǤWithin academic literature the 
role of the ECHR in Turkey tends to be reduced to discussion of a handful of 
substantive decisions. This article argues that there is much to be gained from closer 
examination of the (changing) dynamics of the ECHR in Turkey and the regulation 
of displacement. Two innovations can be observed from this case-study: a special   Ǯǯ  and a proactive approach to fact-finding. The Turkish 
cases indicate a need for further investigation of the role of fact-finding in cases of 
displacement and the development of context-specific rules on sustainable returns 
processes. 
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     INTRODUCTION 
  
This paper examines the extensive litigation of forced displacement in Turkey under 
the ECHR, based on a database of the published decisions of the (former) European 
Commission of Human Rightsi and the European Court of Human Rights. The Turkish 
cases appeared prior to the adoption of international norms and were a landmark as 
the first claims of a practice of forced displacement before a regional human rights 
tribunal. The repetition of complaints and long-running oversight also speak to the 
unusual role of the ECHR in Turkey. A total of 1,250 individual applications relating to 
3,107 applicants were submitted between 1993 and 2010. By examining the resulting 
171 cases, decided throughout a 17 year period (1995-2011), ii  this paper aims to 
improve our understanding of how regional human rights mechanisms can be used to 
challenge displacement and increase the prospects for durable returns. It identifies 
innovations in ECHR procedure and the creation of core legal rules on forced 
displacement. Applicants benefitted from a protective form of access and the 
Commission was surprisingly proactive in conducting fact-finding. The Turkish cases 
emphasise the limitations of normative analyses in capturing what regional tribunals    ǡ 




consequences of destruction of property and denial of access or return, on the other 
hand, discloses an increasing pragmatism at Strasbourg and a failure to push for 
remedies capable of facilitating sustainable returns.  
The entry into force in 2012 of   ǯ  , the first 
binding treaty on internal displacement, highlights the crucial role of regional human 
rights actors in the regulation of displacement. In recognising the need for a ǲcompletely distinct and binding legal frameworkǳ (Giustiniani 2011: 352) the African 
Union has resolved a long-standing institutional and normative gap. The problem 
within international law stems from the primacy of refugee protection, under the 1951 
Refugee Convention, and its limitation to persons having crossed a national border. 
The border-crossing distinction became the subject of intense scrutiny during the 
1990s given the rapidly increasing scale of internal displacement (Cohen and Deng 
1998) and the consequent lack of protection for internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
(Lee 2001: 456). The lack of ǲ, all-inclusive ǳ (Stavropoulou 
1994:  ? ? ?Ȍǲǳ (Cohen 2004: 461) at the UN further 
compounded the problem. The creation of a UN Special Representative on Internal 
Displacement in 1992 (UN Commission on Human Rights 1992) created a distinct 
space for the development of a legal framework. Statesǯ   the 
decision to fuse existing rules within human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee 
law, ǯ (Cohen 1998: 4), and a set of 
non-binding rules was seen to be preferable to a new treaty (Kälin 2008). States cannot 
be compelled to accept and comply with the various obligations within the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement (UN Commission on Human Rights 1998) and 
IDPs are neither attributed legal status nor conferred directly enforceable rights. This 
paper employs the Turkish case-study to investigate the possibilities offered by 
regional human rights tribunals in cases of forced displacement. The investigation will 
begin with a brief comment on litigating conflict under the ECHR, then examine access, 
fact-finding, and state responsibility. 
 
CONFLICT-LAWYERING AND THE ECHR IN TURKEY 
  
The Northern Irish conflict provides an important context to the Turkish case-study 




conflict and emergency measures. The Northern Irish example speaks clearly to the 
difficulties involved in conflict-lawyering at Strasbourg. In the first instance, McEvoy 
has identified how ǲǳ
among lawyers at the initial stages of the conflict, and a subsequent failure to pursue ǲan overarching legal strategy which might deliver mateǳȋ ? ? ? ?: 
352, 358). Lack of legal knowledge and diligence in submitting claims also kept 
various controversial practices away from the Court. Cases alleging discrimination 
in education, employment and housing, for instance, failed at an early stage due to 
poor legal representation (Dickson 2010: 46-47). When well-presented claims were 
submitted, the ECHR system proved largely ineffective as a tool to challenge security 
policies. The Courtǯ approach to internment, for example, has been criticised for 
causing ǲȏȐǥǳȋ ? ? ? ?: 
363). 
 
The same lack of awareness prevailed among lawyers in Turkey despite ǯ 
recognition of the right to individual petition before the Commission in 1987. A 
seminar given by Kevin Boyle in South-east Turkey in 1992 proved a turning-point 
as lawyers from the Human Rights Association of Turkey (G Ç º, 
IHD) began to work with a team of Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP) lawyers 
to bring cases to Strasbourg. The IHD/KHRP litigation programme led to a 
remarkable number of judgments finding violations relating to the conflict; 175 
decisions as of September 2008 (Committee of Ministers 2008b). The IHD/KHRP 
network was also crucial to devising and executing a legal strategy that pushed the 
limits of the ECHR system. The following section will identify an early, qualified 
success in convincing the ECHR bodies of the existence of special conditions in 
South-east Turkey. 
 ǣǲA BRIDGE OF PETITIONSǳ 
  Ǯ ǯ   lly framed to present the 
individual claims as the result of State policy, according to which a denial of local 
redress bore witness to a practice of violations. Applicants typically alleged that 




and destroyed homes and possessions, forcing them to abandon their homes and 
communities. A prolonged period of State of Emergency Rule (OHAL, ºòò
Hal) within the region (1987-2002) provided for a broad range of restrictions on 
rights and a legal basis for forced movement. The majority of applications related to 
incidents occurring during a two-year period (1993-1994) within the provinces of 
DiÇǢ specific temporal and geographic patterns can be observed 
within each province. At the heart of the complaints was the suggestion that the 
OHAL system created impunity for a practice of forced displacement. The IHD/KHRP 
litigation strategy saw cases submitted to Strasbourg prior to the conclusion of 
domestic investigations. In some cases applications were submitted in the absence 
of domestic complaints, with the potential t ǲ   ǳiv from 
South-east Turkey to Strasbourg. The IHD/KHRP in this way knowingly challenged 
the subsidiary nature of international human rights law.  
 
Applicants are as a matter of principle of international law required to first seek 
redress at the national level so as to prevent ǲdomestic courts being superseded by ǳ (Cançado Trindade 1983: 3). Prior to the Turkish cases the 
ECHR bodies had, however, recognised an exception to the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies rule in the  Ǯadministratiǯ of human rights, 
situations involving a ǲrepetition of actsǳ and ǲofficial toleranceǳ of such acts 
(Denmark et al v. Greece 1969: p 195). The Commission first recognised the ability 
of individuals to submit such claims in its examination of the treatment of detainees 
in Northern Ireland, in a case in        ǯ
lawyers (Donnelly 1973). It also accepted that ǲ ǳ  ǲ-  ǳ in the case of an 
administrative practice of torture or ill-treatment (Ǯǯǡ ?Ȍ. A subsequent 
decision rejecting the claims, on the basis that applicants had either received 
compensation or that civil proceedings were ongoing, appeared to reign in the 
potential for individual claimants (Donnelly 1975). The IHD/KHRP strategy 
regarding Turkey was intent on succeeding where Donnelly had failed. In each case 
the scale of destruction and displacement was claimed to reflect a ǲhigh-level 
Government policy - an administrative practice - in regard to which all remedies are 





From the very first village destructions cases the ECHR bodies expressed serious 
concerns with the standard of domestic investigations. In Akdivar (1996) domestic 
remedies were ruled ineffective owing to a lack of meaningful investigations, the ǲǳ prospect of a successful civil claim, and the inability to exclude the ǯ  following domestic complaints. Administrative claims 
were found to have reasonable prospects of success only where damage was claimed 
to have been caused by the PKK or during clashes between security forces and the 
PKK, not regarding allegedly intentional acts of the security forces (ç 1997). 
The Court also ruled that a failure to investigate complaints had created a reasonable  ǲǳ seek domestic remedies (Selçuk 
and Asker 1998: para 70). In one case a ǲs ǳ investigation was 
closed without the taking of statements from members of the security forces (Ayder 
2004: para 60), in another the case file was transmitted for investigation by the very 
gendarmes alleged to have   ǯ  (Altun 2004). In case 
after case the ECHR bodies declared ǲǳ
displaced the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies, even where no domestic 
complaints were lodged (ç 1997: paras 59-60). 
 
The ECHR bodies drew a paper-thin line between the individual cases before them 
and the general situation in Turkey. The protective form of access granted to 
applicants created a unique oversight of the situation in South-east Turkey. The 
problem for the Strasbourg bodies was that they were assuming the role of first 
instance tribunal regarding an issue presenting itself through a large, and growing, 
body of similar complaints. The same pressure does not arise under the African and 
Inter-American systems due to the provision for general or actio popularis claims, 
and collective review, in individual cases. Driven by a concern to prevent a flood of 
petitions from Turkey, the Commission and Court limited their decisions in two 
ways. Firstly, they repeatedly stated that the decisions  ǲ  ǳǲ
that remedies are ineffective in this region of ǳ. Secondly, they ruled in each 
instance that it was not necessary to examine the alleged administrative practice 





The unhappy compromise on domestic remedies is but one illustration of the limited 
capacity of the ECHR complaints procedure regarding alleged systematic violations. 
The failure to recognise an administrative practice was criticised by Zwaak as a 
missed opportunity to ǲ  clear message to the Turkish governmentǳ and 
encourage other States to submit an inter-State claim (Zwaak 1997: 109). The KHRP 
team also questioned the ǯ given their repeated 
decisions finding domestic remedies ineffective (Reidy et al 1997: 165-166). The 
consistent failure of the Turkish authorities to evidence genuine, effective 
investigations gave the ECHR bodies little choice but to exercise discretion in 
applying the exhaustion rule. Its rigid enforcement would have been perverse in 
light of the realities of access to justice under the OHAL system. By exposing a 
consistent lack of local redress the IHD/KHRP secured an exceptional role for the 
Commission, in particular, Ǯde facto ǯ (Leach et al 2009: 27). 
This not only had significant consequences for the ECHR proceedings in each 
relevant case, but also contributed to a long-lasting expectation of the ECHR system 
in South-east Turkey. There remains considerably greater awareness of the ECHR 
than of domestic remedies among IDPs in Turkey as a combined result of the unusual 
access granted to applicants and a pervasive mistrust of the State ȋT? ? ? ? ?ǣ ?-10). 
The following section will examine the ECHR fact-finding process and propose that 
fact-finding should be viewed as a core aim of human rights litigation regarding 
displacement, with distinct impacts for victims, NGOS and civil society. 
 
FIRST INSTANCE FACT-FINDING 
 
The normal application of the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule tends to ensure 
that facts are established by domestic courts before cases appear at Strasbourg. The 
immediate effect of recognising the ǲ ǳ   
remedies in the OHAL region was to recast the role of the ECHR in Turkey. The 
Commission had previously conducted fact-finding regarding various crises, 
including the situation in Greece  ? ? ? ?ǯ± (Denmark et al v Greece 
1969) and during the Northern Irish conflict (Donnelly; Ireland v. United Kingdom 




without precedent. What was unusual regarding Turkey, however, was the ǯ   first instance fact-finder throughout a series of individual 
cases. The Turkish conflict cases are conspicuous among the record of ECHR fact-
finding, comprising 60 of the 92 cases involving fact-finding as of 2009 (Leach et al 
2009: 24); including 16 village destructions cases. This proactive approach was the 
key innovation in the village destructions cases. It also drew the Commission and 
Court into the most difficult stage of their review of the complaints. 
 
Human rights fact-finding has a recognised capacity to deliver outcomes that speak 
beyond individual events or cases, particularly regarding situations of conflict and 
emergency rule. Fact-finding can help to depoliticise proceedings (Helfer and 
Slaughter 1997-1998: 303) and signal ǲic ǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?ǣ144). It can  ǲ ǳ ǲǳ, which can then 
serve as an advocacy tool (Cavallaro and Brewer 2008: 794). Furthermore, the KHRP 
legal team welcomed the ability of applicants to be heard in-person through the 
ECHR process (Reidy et al 1997: 171), itself a remedial act. However, the lack of 
power to compel the attendance of witnesses and submission of documents under 
the ECHR limited the potential narrative value of fact-finding. The political context 
to the cases inevitably created additional problems. Vivanco and Bhansali emphasise 
in this regard the ǲmǳ in order to guarantee the credibility 
of the process and resulting facts (1998: 424-425). In practice flexibility is an 
intrinsic feature of human rights fact-finding, and the ECHR rules on admissibility of 
evidence, the burden of proof, corroboration, and use of inferences have developed 
on a case-by-case basis. The Turkish cases demonstrate that in the primary aim of 
establishing facts ǲthorough, politically objective, and procedurally ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ 603) can lead to a balancing act between equality of 
arms and the desire to secure State participation.  
 
The Turkish government employed various techniques of denial in its response to 
the allegations, rejected the allegations in successive cases as an abuse of the ECHR 
system, and attacked the credibility of applicants (T?ali 2010). Applications were 




produced by influence of the PKK and obtained     ǳ
(Selçuk and Asker 1996: para 140). Aǯs of events were dismissed as ǲ ǳ ȋHasan Ilhan 2004: para 21) and ǲǳ ȋG 2002). 
Where the government was prepared to accept ǲǳ been conducted in tǯǡ the 
destruction of any houses or property was frequently denied (e.g. Hasan Ilhan 2004; 
ç 1996). In two cases in which the government recognised that ǯ
homes and possessions had in fact been destroyed, this was explained as the result 
of clashes with PKK forces rather than a deliberate act by security forces (Ayder 
1999, Ahmet Özkan 2004). The fact-finding process was therefore critical to the 
proceedings as a whole in uncovering the truth of events in the OHAL region. It also 
presented a test to the legitimacy of the ECHR. For the IHD/KHRP team fact-finding 
presented an opportunity to establish a counter-narrative. Moreover, fact-finding 
was decisive to applicantǯof success: only one case examined without 
fact-finding led to a finding of substantive rather than procedural or remedial 
violations: the village returns case of º (2004). 
 
Fact-finding inevitably brought to the fore the tension between the scope of the 
allegations and the right to individual petition. The ECHR system simply did not have 
the capacity to examine the full picture presented through the applications. Fact-
finding was conducted in 16 cases, in 12 cases by the Commission, relating to 
incidents in five provinces; the majority of fact-finding investigations related to 
DiyarbakÇ province (11 cases). There was also a clear temporal focus: the fact-
finding investigations related to incidents occurring in 1992 (2 cases), 1993 (11 
cases) and 1994 (3 cases). As further example of the purely representative nature of 
fact-finding, one application was selected for fact-finding out of a group of 202 
applications relating to the alleged destruction of large parts of the town of Lice in 
Diyarbakir in October 1993 (Ayder 1999). The remaining 201 applications were 
settled through ex gratia payments totalling just over EUR 4.4m, albeit ǯ
decisions recognised the collective nature of the cases by referring to ǲ ? ? ?





The evidential approach of the Commission and Court was largely driven by 
problems with the documentary evidence. There was a noted failure on the part of 
the Turkish authorities to submit documents within time, or at all, and often without 
sufficient explanation. The Commission was frequently unable to secure access to all 
operation and incident reports (e.g. Bilgin 2000: para 26), including operational 
orders for helicopter forces (Ayder 2004: para 36). Records of operations, when 
received,  ǲnot to     ǳ (Orhan 2002: para 269). In Ahmet 
Özkan (2004) the Government did supply a cache of more than 100 documents, 
thereby enabling a detailed analysis of the number and status of security forces 
involved and the ammunition used. The Commission also noted with concern that         ǲ   
stereotyped and preconceived assumptions to suit the purpose of the document in ǳ (ç 1996: para 145). Oral testimony was as a result central to the 
ECHR investigations. A total of 201 individual testimonies were heard over 45 days 
of hearings. The distribution of witnesses speaks to more intensive efforts in certain 
cases: almost half of all the witnesses were heard in three cases, 48 in Ahmet Özkan 
(2004), 30 in Yöyler (2003) and 20 in Ayder (1999). Although evidence was received 
from a wide range of witnesses on behalf of the parties, significant weight was 
attached to the opportunity for in-person assessments of applicants: in two cases 
the Commission decided it could not establish facts on account of the non-
attendance of applicants (Gündem 1996, Ç 1997).  
 
The Commission and Court gave initial priority to assessing the reliability and 
demeanour of applicants and to the existence of corroborative evidence. The 
government thus bore the responsibility of rebutting claims where applicants and 
eye-witnesses were judged to have given credible accounts. The ECHR bodies also 
took a pragmatic view of a lack of clarity regarding dates in the evidence given by or 
on behalf of applicants, accepting that problems arose due to age, the passage of time 
and the difficulty of presenting accounts of traumatic events (Selçuk and Asker 1996: 
para 153). Their assessment of such oral evidence was cautious nonetheless, 
involving a clear effort to determine the existence and impact of hearsay (e.g. Orhan 
2002: para 282), conspiracy or animosity against State officials or public authorities 




and possible PKK responsibility (e.g. G 2004: paras 134, 145). The evaluation of 
the applicant testimony as largely credible and consistent was in direct contrast to 
that of government witnesses. Oral evidence given by villagers on behalf of the 
government was frequently judged to lack supporting evidence or to reflect 
animosity vis-à-     ǯ  (ç 1996: para 
163). The evidence of Gendarmerie Commanders was deemed even less convincing. 
While the Court      ǲprofessional, convincing and ǳ on general matters, the same was not true of their accounts of specific 
details under questioning (Ahmet Özkan 2004: para 98).  
 
In total, the ECHR bodies established a factual basis for finding state responsibility 
for acts of destruction and displacement in 12 cases; responsibility was also found 
for enforced disappearances (G 2004 and Orhan 2002) and the deaths, 
blindfolding and forced marching of villagers (Ahmet Özkan 2004). Adverse 
inferences were lied on in only three cases; on the basis of contradictions within 
official testimony (Hasan Ilhan 2004) and non-attendance of a military general (Gek 
2004, Orhan 2002). The fact-finding reports documented in detail the severity of 
treatment of applicants and   ǲ ǳ  ǲa collective attitude ǳȋT?ali 2010: 324). They 
also generated the first independent narrative of events regarding an area that had 
long experienced severe restrictions on freedom of expression (Yildiz and Brigham 
2006). One former Turkish Representative to Strasbourg complained that the 
burden of proof had been reversed and the ECHR bodies ǲformed an a priori 
opinion of Tuǳȋ
òò ? ? ? ?ǣ 19). Such is the legitimacy test posed 
by human rights fact-finding in politically-charged cases. In reality only one outcome 
was possible in light of two factors: (1) the repeated government failure to provide 
information and witnesses, and; (2) the refusal of officials to contemplate security 
force responsibility in the face of corroborated testimony. 
 
Although the fact-finding process was crucial when understood in terms of 
exposure, the case-by-case examination limited the scope of the factual findings and 
the broader narrative generated by the ECHR process. The Court commented in G, 




framework of a larger operation being condǳȋ2004: 
para 137). In another case ǲa disturbing amount of relevant questions 
remained unansweǳ (Ayder 2004: para 41). The ECHR lacks the capacity of the 
Inter-American Court, for instance, to generate a broader narrative of displacement 
through fact-finding (e.g. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia 2005). Getting 
to the general truth was beyond the scope of ECHR fact-finding. This should not 
detract from the exceptional contribution of the ECHR process. The ECHR fact-
finding process gathered a staggering amount of evidence, evidence that, at the least, 
consistently exposed an official refusal to recognise security force failings in the ǲǳǤThe fact-finding hearings gave space for the voices of the 
displaced and ensured the right to individual petition had purchase in spite of the 
difficulties of securing documentary evidence. The resulting judgments, entirely 
dependent on the fact-finding process, were an important advocacy tool. They also 
impacted on broader political processes: the EU Commission reports oǯ
accession process rely heavily on the ECHR decisions in evaluating the state of 
human rights in Turkey. Following the abolition of the Commission in 1998, and with 
the reduced scale of the conflict and extent of OHAL rule (rescinded in 2002), the 
new full-time Court decided against fact-finding in successive Turkish cases. The ǯ ǡ   roblems with the passage of time and lack of 
documentary evidence (Matyar 2002: para 7), is unconvincing given the previous 
experience of fact-finding and suggests a policy decision against fact-finding. The 
following section will demonstrate the impact of the changing role of the ECHR in 
Turkey and critically assess the ǯstate responsibility, redress and 
sustainable return.  
 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND REDRESS 
 
As a treaty guaranteeing civil and political human rights the ECHR is not well-suited 
to capturing fully the legal consequences of forced displacement. The ECHR cannot 
guarantee substantive humanitarian law protections as per the UN Guiding 
Principles or the Kampala Convention. Nor can it respond to the effects of 
displacement on the social, economic and cultural rights of individuals and groups. 




bodies nonetheless created a significant precedent in international human rights 
law. The village destructions decisions have been relied on by the UN Committee 
against Torture (Hajrizi Dzemajl et al v. Yugoslavia 2002), the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights (Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia 2006) and the African ǯ (Centre for Housing Rights and Evictions 
v. The Sudan 2009) in their subsequent development of legal principles regarding 
forced evictions and displacement. Problems arise, however, with the ECHR bodiesǯ 
analysis of the effects of the destruction of homes and denial of access or return. 
 
Throughout the merits decisions the ECHR bodies stressed the deliberate and 
violent nature of destructions by way of finding ǲǳ breaches for which no 
juǡǲa particularly grav ǳ
with ǯ       (Article 8) and the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No 1). The destructions had ǲǳ            
residence. Although prepared to accept the gravity of the violations, neither the 
Commission nor the Court accepted that the acts of destruction constituted forced 
displacement. In Akdivar the Commission recognized that the destruction of homes ǲcaused the    ǳ  was not satisfi ǲthat the applicants ǳ (Akdivar 1995: para 213). The Court similarly noted in Orhan ǲhǳbut refused to rule on whether 
the forced evacuation of the village was itself a violation (Orhan 2002: para 379). 
One explanation lies with the inability of fact-finding to establish the motivations 
behind the destructions. Nonetheless, the failure to distinguish between ǲǳ    arbitrary acts of house destruction and denial of 
redress or return, or to elaborate any substantive positive duties on the State, sits 
uneasily with the factual findings. Violations of the prohibition of inhuman 
treatment (Article 3) were important in recognising the effects on the security, 
welfare, shelter and livelihood of applicants (e.g. Selçuk and Asker 1996: para 177) 
and signalling that no justification would permit such treatment (Bilgin 2000: para 
102). The denial of domestic redress led to repeated violations of the right to an 
effective remedy (Article 13). In spite of the repetition, gravity and effects of the 




practice, and discriminatory policy against Kurdish citizens were abruptly 
dismissed due to lack of evidence. The IHD/KHRP litigation programme was unable ǲǳ
the individual cases. 
 
The finding of violations of Articles 3, 8, 13 and P1-1 provided validation of the 
individual applicaǯ, and compensation by way of pecuniary damages for a 
range of economic losses. Non-pecuniary damages were also ordered on account of 
the deliberate nature of the destructions   ǲsubsequent reǳ. The 
ECHR bodies stressed in relation to Article 13 that claims regarding alleged forced 
ev    ǲ  ǳ, either by way of 
investigations, the provision of alternative housing or of financial assistance 
(Akdivar 1995: para 240). In the oversight of compliance with the judgments, 
however, the specific needs of the applicants, and IDPs in Turkey generally, were 
lost as the Committee of Ministers took the somewhat unusual decision to 
collectivise the Turkish conflict cases (e.g. Committee of Ministers 2008b). The issue 
of village destructions was subsǲreduced 
the questions of legal reform, acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and accountability 
to technical and bureaucratic impǳ (T?ali 2010: 313). The concern to 
address the structural problems with respect to security force accountability was a 
welcome approach, but came at the cost of passing over the need to deal with past 
violations and to ensure a sustainable returns process. 
 
The decision to bring an end to fact-finding, and the resulting inability of applicants 
to substantiate claims of village destructions, prompted a step-change in the ǯ
review. In the leading Ǯvillage returnsǯ case of º (2004) the Court shifted its 
focus on the need to facilitate the return of the applicants to their villages rather than 
examine the cause of their displacement almost ten years previously. ǯ
assessment was also unusual in that examined the situation of IDPs generally as 
regards return. In any event, it found that efforts to assist IDPs, through the ǮReturn 
to Village and Rehabilitation Projectǯ, had ǲnot been converted into practical steps to 




ǡǡǲ       ǳǡ closed a disproportionate 
burden on the applicants in breach of their peaceful enjoyment of possessions (para 
154). The subsequent acceptance of a large-scale compensation scheme as an 
effective remedy for IDPs (G­ 2006) brings us back to the lesson from Donnelly: 
the provision, or reasonable prospects, of compensation will often be enough to 
satisfy the Court on domestic remedies.  
 
The G­ decision turned on the applicantsǯ  to refute the governmentǯ 
evidence of 440 successful domestic claims for denial of access to property and loss 
of income. Compensation was deemed available in theory and practice to IDPs, with 
practical benefits to the Court by clearing around 1,500 pending village returns 
applications from its docket (including 57 published decisions regarding 590 
applications submitted by 1,599 applicants). The reduction of the issue of 
sustainable return to compensation, unaccompanied by measures on housing, 
adequate standards of living, or satisfaction, can provide only limited gains. The 
absence of responsibility ǯ, 
whereby displacement is reconstituted as a mere by- ǲǳ(Sert, 2016: 6, 8). T?ali argues, for instance, that the compensation scheme 
enables ǲ    ǯ  ǳ   
acknowledge responsibility ȋT? ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤ posit the compensation scheme     ǲ       ǳ
rather than an effort to address the underlying causes (Ayata and Yükseker 2005: 
32) and question the fairness of various aspects of the Compensation Law system 
(Kurban et al 2006: 33-40; Sert, 2016: 8-9). The EU also expressed concerns about 
its effectiveness prior to G­ (EU Commission 2005: 38-39).    
 
The Committee of Ministers closed its supervision of ǯcompliance 
with º in June 2008 (Committee of Ministers 2008a) with the effect that there 
is no running oversight of implementation at Strasbourg. The Court subsequently 
rejected further challenges to the Compensation Law in the Akbay઒r-group of cases 
(2011); four published decisions relating to 1,017 applications. The general 




displacement and sustainable return. Indeed, the EU Commission continues to 
question the lack of a comprehensive strategy to assist IDPs in Turkey (EU 
Commission 2015: 25-26). Such criticism, however, betrays unrealistic expectations 
of what the ECHR system can, or is willing to, offer on remedies for this large-scale, 
protracted displacement. The post-1998 Court has turned away from the earlier 
proactive approach and sought to re-emphasise the subsidiary status of the ECHR.  ǯ pragmatism is evident throughout the G­ and Akbay઒r-group 
decisions, with progress towards ensuring access to domestic financial settlements 
taking sole priority. Displacement in Turkey cannot be fully resolved by 
compensatory redress of property rights violations, nor have the ECHR judgments 
acted as a disincentive to further acts of forced displacement (Human Rights Watch 
2016). Sustainable return, for those who desire to return, is contingent upon the 
conclusion of a broader political process and rights-based peace agreement that 




The record of the ECHR in Turkey illustrates the complexities involved in litigating 
displacement, but also the capacity of strategic litigation to deliver various 
outcomes. The ECHR proceedings had distinct impacts for victims, NGOs and civil 
society, particularly at the admissibility and fact-finding stages. From the IHD/KHRP 
litigation programme we can clearly observe the importance of local and 
international co-ordination to the pursuit of an ambitious legal strategy. The 
advance selection of priority issues and combined legal knowledge were 
instrumental in securing a protective form of access to justice at Strasbourg. The 
IHD/KHRP successes also served as encouragement to lawyers in Turkey, who 
continue to engage the ECHR system across a broad range of human rights issues. 
Regional tribunals are likely to struggle to get to the underlying issues and causes of 
conflict and of displacement. Furthermore, the Turkish experience attests to the real 
possibility that genuine, appropriate and effective transitional justice measures are 
side-lined by limited remedial schemes. NGOs, lawyers and activists must also work 




lost within broader political and technical processes of reform or conflict-
management or resolution. 
 
Regional human rights tribunals can, and will, modify their normal mode of 
operation where violations occur within the context of a general restriction on 
rights. In cases of conflict-induced displacement the possibility of direct or special 
access to regional tribunals presents an opportunity to expose and identify, at a 
procedural stage, patterns of immunity and denial. The exhaustion of domestic 
remedies rulings sent a clear message that an absence of local protection and 
redress would not stand untested as a result of strict application of procedural rules. 
By assuming a distinctive form of oversight of the situation in South-east Turkey the 
ECHR bodies gave substantive meaning to the requirement of effective remedies and 
contributed a record of events in the OHAL region. The experience of ECHR fact-
finding in Turkey also speaks, however, to the structural limitations of ECHR system. 
The right to individual petition and the limited capacity of ECHR fact-finding both 
inhibited the ability of the ECHR bodies to examine fully the scope and causes of 
displacement in Turkey. The role of fact-finding and truth processes, and their social 
purchase, in the context of displacement is a topic deserving closer attention. 
Equally important is the need to elaborate context-specific guidelines on human 
rights, transitional justice and sustainable returns processes. In this way we can 




i The Commission was abolished and a full-time Court was created by Protocol No. 11 to the ECHR (1994).   
ii All figures given in the text are based on the database. The author is aware of a series of unpublished 
inadmissibility decisions; email communication with the Registry of the Court, 26 May 2009 & 9 
September 2015.  
iii The Ǯvillage guardsǯ system requires villagers to work alongside security forces in military operations 
and to defend villages against the PKK. 
iv A term used by Mehmet Nur Terzi, speaking of his plan regarding the filing of detention complaints 
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